We develop a novel Russian-language electronic content analysis dictionary and method to analyse Russian state media's framing of the Euromaidan protests. We find that around the time of Crimea's annexation, the Kremlin-controlled media projected media narratives of protests as chaos and disorder along with legalistic jargon about the status of ethnic Russians and federalisation, only to abandon this strategy by the end of April 2014. The shift in media narratives corresponding to the outbreak of Donbas violence gives credence to arguments about Putin's tactical and interests-driven foreign policy, while nuancing those that highlight the role of norms and values. To redress these omissions in scholarship, we develop a novel electronic content analysis method and dictionary for exploring media framing of protests. The content analysis method that we develop in this paper is called Latent Semantic Scaling (LSS) (Author 2015). This technique facilitates the analysis of semantic nuances of how a particular subject-in our case it is protests-is covered in the media. Applying the LSS technique, we constructed a Russian-language dictionary of words frequently appearing in stories about protests. The dictionary construction process involved assigning scores along a disorder-freedom to protest scale to lines of text in randomly-selected batches of news stories on protest. This part of the analysis was performed by coders with native Russian language fluency. The computer program that we developed then 'learned' what scores to assign to text on protest based on the human component of coding. Because this process involved both human coding and electronic analysis, it is known as 'supervised machine learning'. The dictionary could be applied to perform electronic content analysis of large volumes of news stories so as to explore over-time shifts in the media framing of protest.
Introduction
It is well known that Russia deployed modern media technologies as a foreign policy tool in the wake of Ukraine's Euromaidan, annexation of Crimea and war in the Donbas (Cottiero, Kucharski et al. 2015; Darczewska 2014; Dubovyk 2015; Dunn and Bobick 2014; Dyczok 2015; Galeotti 2015 Galeotti , 2015 Gaufman 2015; Hutchings and Szostek 2015; Hutchings and Tolz 2015; Leshchenko 2014; Oates 2013; Pomerantsev 2015; Schimpfossl and Yablokov 2014 ). Yet, systematic scholarship on Russia's precise media manipulative tactics has remained scarce. A handful of studies have rigorously analysed the narratives deployed in the Kremlincontrolled media in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis (Cottiero, Kucharski et al. 2015; Hutchings and Szostek 2015; Hutchings and Tolz 2015; Nelson, Orttung et al. 2015 ). Yet, few other observers have gone beyond restating Russia's well-known shock tactics of broadcasting fabricated allegations on state TV like the alleged crucifixion of an ethnically Russian boy; or the image of a heavily pregnant Russian woman, ostensibly murdered by Ukrainian nationalists in the Donbas. Such observations present us with a rather static view of Russia's media tactics, and reveal little about the nuances of shifts in these tactics as the conflict unfolded. 7 news to focus on, the volume of coverage, and where the news sources place specific stories in terms of sequence or location, can likewise powerfully affect what the public perceive to be 'important topics of the day'.
'While the press may not tell us what to think, it is stunningly successful in telling us what to think about ', he writes (1977, p. 90 
) (emphasis original).
The other concept of framing that we deploy in our analysis had been popularized by the sociologist Erving Goffman several decades ago and has been widely used since in social movement scholarship in particular (Goffman 1975) . We here employ the definition of framing by Thomas Nelson et al. (1997, p. 567 ) as a 'process by which a communication source such as a news organization, defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy'. 'Frames serve as bridges between elite discourse about a problem or issue and popular comprehension of that issue', write Nelson et al. in another article (1997b, p. 224) . Frames can be thus regarded as cues for interpreting matters of public significance and for making judgements about appropriate remedies for particular problems. Frames can go beyond simply reinforcing existing opinions: they can in fact help alter public attitudes and preferences (Cottle 2008; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Lindekilde 2014; McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996; Peng 2008; Snow and Benford 1992; Snow, E. Burke Rochford et al. 1986; Snow, Louis A. Zurcher et al. 1980; Zald 1992) .
When it comes to the nuances of framing specifically related to protest, following Nelson et al. (1997) , and building upon our earlier frame analysis (Authors 2016) we distinguish between two broad shades of media framing of protest: protest as public disorder (the disorder frame); and, alternatively, protest as representing the right of citizens to public assembly (the freedom to protest frame). Of course, these contrasting frames could be regarded as extremes on a semantic scale whereby frames on one end stigmatize street protest, and, on the other end, portray it as legitimate or desirable in a democratic state. For example, in a story framed as freedom to protest, we might find positive references to protests as respectable and legitimate expressions of mass concern about important political issues. In a disorder story, we might see protesters as marginal figures, or we might be shown pictures of armed police in riot gear (Nelson, Clawson et al. 1997) . In democracies too, the media often tend to default to a 'status quo' perspective (McLeod and Detenber 1999) , subtly delegitimising street rallies (Deluca, Lawson et al. 2012; Smith, McCarthy et al. 2001) . We would expect the media in authoritarian states to be especially prone to resorting to a disorder narrative of protests that challenge the domestic regime or its allies abroad.
In analysing the media's role in the Euromaidan and the domestic and inter-state crisis that followed, much of the analytical inquiry has focused on the role of online social media use by citizens (Bohdanova 2014; Dickinson 2014; Goban-Klas 2014; Leshchenko 2014; Onuch 2015; Zaliznyak 2014) . Some studies have touched upon both the agenda-setting and framing aspects of Russian media (Goble 2014; Hutchings and Szostek 2015; Potyatynyk and Potyatynyk 2014) . Thus, Potyatynyk and Potyatynyk (2014) have shown how Russian media narratives drew on the Second World War symbolism and vocabulary to foment ethnically-based hostility towards Ukrainian-speakers and thereby justify Russia's irredentism in Ukraine (see also Kuzio 2015; Suslov 2014; Teper 2015) . Cottiero et al. (2015) also highlight how the narratives of 'fascism' and 'Nazism' were arguably effective in tapping into the repository of shared wartime national memories.
Our focus and methodological strategy are different here. Essentially, we explore the extent to which Russia replicated the semantic toolkit that the Kremlin used against its own protesters at home to stigmatize street action as inherently dangerous and destabilizing at various stages of the crisis. We also analyse the proposed remedies that featured in the media against the backdrop of rhetoric on violence and disorder. The changes in the nuances of protest framing and in the likelihood of particular agenda featuring in the media as the events unfolded are also explored. We know from a number of qualitative studies that following Crimea's annexation, the Russian regime changed its tactics in Ukraine in response to intra-elite disagreements and loss of control over the Donbas rebels. For example, scholars have pointed to Russia's dis-engagement from the agenda of 'federalisation' or Crimea-style separation of Ukraine's South-eastern regions when Russia's President Vladimir Putin realised that a relatively peaceful scenario was not to be repeated in the Donbas. This scenario was even less likely in the cities of Kharkiv and Odessa and the four areas that Russia began to refer to as 'New Russia', namely Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Kherson and Mykolayiv (Kuzio 2015; Wilson 2014) . Russia also allegedly changed track when it became evident that only a minority of Russian-speakers supported Ukraine's 'federalisation', or backed the separation of regions with significant Russian-speaking populations (Alexseev 2015; Dubovyk 2015; Giuliano 2015; Hale, Kravets et al. 2015; Haran 2015; Kuzio 2015) . Yet, few scholars have heeded the call by Stephen Hutchings and Joanna Szostek to regard Russia's media narratives in particular as an analytical mirror of the goals, the shifting ideas and fears driving foreign policy in the Ukrainian crisis (2015, p. 184) . Rigorously analysing the shifts in the media's agenda-setting and framing would enable us to nuance our understanding of how the Russian regime's tactics evolved and changed over time as it reacted to the rapidly escalating conflict. Based on the above discussion, we articulate our hypotheses as follows:
Framing H1: Russian state-controlled media's framing of protest throughout the duration of the Euromadan will be significantly more likely to trend in the direction of the disorder framing as compared to coverage by non-statecontrolled news sources.
H2: Russian state-controlled media will be significantly more likely to employ the disorder framing of protest in the wake of the annexation of Crimea as compared to earlier coverage of the Euromaidan protests.
H3: Russian state-controlled media will be significantly less likely to employ the disorder framing of protest after the eruption of hostilities in the Donbas as compared to coverage of protests in the wake of the annexation of Crimea.
Agenda setting
H4: Russian state-controlled media will be significantly more likely to frame protest as disorder when advancing the agenda of Ukraine's 'federalisation', 'referenda' on the status of regions with significant Russianspeaking populations, 'reform' and 'constitutional' status of ethnically 'Russian' or 'Russian-speaking' populations.
H5: Russian state-controlled media will be significantly more likely than non-state-controlled media sources to advance the agenda of Ukraine's 'federalisation', 'referenda' on the status of regions with significant Russianspeaking populations, 'reform' and 'constitutional status' of ethnically 'Russian' or 'Russian-speaking' populations.
In the following section, we outline the methodology that we have developed to study Russian statecontrolled media's protest framing and agenda setting, and apply it to analyse media coverage of the Euromaidan protests.
Data, Method and Analysis

Methodological strategy
For our analysis, we harvested stories on the Ukrainian crisis from the Integrum media database for the period 1 November 2013 to 31 December 2014. This period corresponds to the weeks just before the start of Euromaidan, and the end of the calendar year in which Russia annexed Crimea, the war in the Donbas erupted, Western sanctions on Russia were imposed, the MH17 flight tragedy occurred and the Minsk process to resolve the crisis commenced. Our analysis proceeds as follows. We begin by applying the framework developed by (Authors 2015) to analyse whether Russian state-controlled media tend to resort to protest framing whereby street protests are portrayed in terms of violence, chaos and disorder (the disorder frame); or, alternatively, in more positive terms, as a citizen right (the freedom to protest frame). Because the Euromaidan rallies in Kiev provided a backdrop for Russia's intervention in Ukraine, we seek to capture the nuances of evolving coverage of street protest in Russian state-controlled media. We are seeking in particular to identify significant or anomalous shifts towards the disorder narrative. Next, we compare coverage by Russia's state-controlled media with coverage by Russia's non-state-controlled news sources, as well as by Zerkalo nedeli (Mirror Weekly), Ukraine's leading news source that is not controlled by the Ukrainian state or the Kremlin. The logic behind this strategy is straightforward. We aim to ensure that media coverage does not simply capture the violence that indeed accompanied the pro-and anti-Europeanisation and pro-and anti-regime protests in Kiev and other parts of Ukraine, but rather, represents attempts to dramatise the disturbances and breakdown of social order accompanying street rallies. Next, we proceed to analyse the agenda-setting aspects of media framing.
Specifically, having identified anomalous swings in Russian state-controlled media's coverage of protest in Ukraine, we generate a random sample of stories for qualitative analysis by the authors. In our reading of the news stories, we aim to ascertain what they tell us about proposed ways of resolving the crisis. We then seek to infer Russia's foreign policy intent from over-time shifts in the media coverage of Ukrainian protests.
Media sources
For our analysis, we have selected both the Russian federal (national) newspapers and federal TV channels, which are all to a greater or lesser extent state-controlled, even though they might have different ownership and management structures (Akhterov 2011; Dobek-Ostrowska and Smaele 2010; McNair 2000 To ascertain whether there are differences in the editorial line between print and online versions of the sources analysed, we consulted the editorial staff of Izvestiya and Komsomolskaya Pravda. 10 We were told that online news articles are produced by the same teams of journalists working on print issues. Content featuring in the print editions represents a subset of the online editions. Journalists from the Russia channel's news programme Vesti whom we contacted indicated that online news include posts harvested from external sources. 11 We expect that the editorial policy of these sources is to selectively exclude stories on sensitive topics. We
were not able to contact the editorial staff of the TV channels, but we assume that the above policy also holds true for those outlets.
Despite the existence of a diverse and complex media market in Ukraine, leading Russian news sources have enjoyed wide readership and viewership, particularly among Ukraine's Russian-speaking populations.
Serhiy Leshchenko (2014) 14 Interfax is a non-governmental media agency. It employs several hundred journalists and has a number of federal, regional and national branch agencies, including in Kiev. Zerkalo nedeli is widely respected among Ukrainian experts as Ukraine's leading Russian-language media source. The newspaper also has Ukrainian-and English-language editions. 15 It is generally considered to be a non-partisan source, albeit of a liberal-leaning orientation.
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For those sources, we downloaded TV transcripts, newspaper articles and newswire reports from the Integrum Russian news database. We searched for stories on protest by employing the search term 'protest*'
('протест*'). If online editions of news sources were available from the database, they were also downloaded, but stored separately from the print or broadcast editions. The total number of news stories harvested for the period 1 November 2013 to 31 December 2014 is 22,568. We present a breakdown of the figure in Table 1 .
Unfortunately, TV transcripts were not available for Channel 1 and for NTV during this period. We therefore used online editions of these news channels as the best available sources approximating the content featuring in the broadcast versions. News stories on the websites of these state-controlled channels are produced by the same staff, so we do not expect the tone of coverage to vary significantly between the online and broadcast sources.
[ Table 1 about here]
Content analysis
Considering the very large number of news stories on protest in the period of investigation, we rely on electronic content analysis.
News filtering
The stories downloaded from the database using a single search keyword are likely to include articles not related to street protests in Ukraine. We therefore introduced a geographical classifier developed by (Author 2015), which can accurately rank countries most strongly associated with particular news stories by automatically constructing a large dictionary of proper names associated with specific countries. The importance of geographical classification in news analysis of a large volume of stories is often overlooked. We consider this process important however because simple keyword matching tends to result in the retrieval of a large number of stories from contexts outside of the geographic area of investigation. For the purpose of dictionary construction, we also downloaded foreign news produced by the Russian news agency ITAR-TASS during the same period, and updated the dictionary each day using the stories for the best classification accuracy. Based on the results of geographical classification, we selected for our analysis stories ranked as having the first or second strongest order of association with Ukraine.
The geographical classifier effectively removes news stories about protests other than those occurring in Ukraine, but we found another source of noise in the data. The keyword 'protest*' employed in the database search may appear in different semantic contexts. For instance, our data contained stories about legislative or judicial battels. These stories are not related to street protest because 'protest' may refer to legal cases. An example would be when the prosecutor's office lodges a 'protest' or when opposition deputies in a regional assembly lodge a formal 'protest' against particular laws or policies. One straightforward and commonly-used approach to eliminating irrelevant stories is to exclude those in which the keyword occurs only once. This procedure is highly selective however and risks eliminating short stories even if they may be about street protests. To capture the relevance of news stories that vary in length, we first measured the normalised frequency of approximately 1,000 protest-related words in each of the news stories. We also made sure that we selected stories with frequency greater than a certain threshold. 17 As a result of the geographical classification and this filtering procedure, the number of news stories decreased to between 10% and 80% of the downloaded material (Table 2) .
[ Table 2 about here]
Computer-aided dictionary making
Our corpus of several thousand full-text news items is of course too voluminous for in-depth qualitative analysis of each news story. Furthermore, it would be challenging for researchers to code documents spanning many months highly consistently. We therefore performed dictionary-based content analysis by employing a disorderfreedom to protest dictionary and scale. In extracting the relevant words from news stories and in developing criteria for attaching scores to those words in our dictionary along the disorder-freedom to protest scale we relied on the Latent Semantic Scaling (LSS) dictionary construction technique and semantic analysis method developed by one of the authors of this paper (2015).
17 These words were selected based on frequencies of co-occurrences ('collocation') with the word 'protest'.
The threshold of 0.046 is the first quantile (25%) of frequencies of the words in a subset of news stories selected employing the conventional keyword matching approach ('protest' occurs more than once).
LSS is essentially a new computer program that helps identify words frequently occurring in stories on a particular topic and to assign scores to those words. The word frequency search part of the technique aids in the dictionary construction process. The process of attaching scores to words in the dictionary is meant to capture the semantic nuances of the usage of words related to the particular topic-in the case of our analysis it is protest. In the existing Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) approaches developed by other scholars, scores are estimated either by statistically analysing word co-occurrence (collocation), or by estimating spatial proximities of words (Landauer and Dutnais 1997; Turney and Littman 2003) . Our technique differs from the above two approaches in that it includes both collocation analysis and spatial analysis. The combination of the two different analytical techniques ensures that LSS dictionaries are robust against the inclusion of irrelevant words in news stories. It is also highly sensitive to subtle differences in news content. We also obtain higher reliability of parameters estimated by exploiting rich information in a large corpus of news stories.
For the present analysis, we adopted the protest framing dictionary from our previous research project on street protest in Russia. For that project, we downloaded a large corpus of Russian-language news stories on protest from the Integrum database of Russian news (containing 27 million words). Two native Russian speakers then content-analysed a sample of thirty news stories sentence by sentence and assigned scores to each sentence on a five-point disorder-freedom to protest scale. The first fifteen news stories were employed to aid the electronic dictionary construction (training set), and the remaining fifteen news stories were then used to validate the result of electronic content analysis employing the dictionary (test set). Figure 1 shows the scores assigned by the human coders and the computer in the training set (black) and test set (red). The framing scores on the disorder-freedom to protest scale using the dictionary range between -20 and +20. The level of agreement between human coding and machine coding in the test set, measured by Pearson's correlation coefficient, was r=0.75. This result demonstrates the validity of dictionary coding of our large text data on protests.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Framing analysis
In order to identify news bursts of coverage of protests in Ukraine, we calculated average volumes of news stories on protest that appeared in Russia's state-controlled media within seven-day periods. As illustrated in Figure 2 , we observe spikes in the volume of news stories on 8 December 2013, on 23 January 2013, on 21
February 2014 and on 12 April 2014. We then treated the stories that appeared within twenty-eight-day windows of the spikes in protest news coverage (±fourteen days of the key dates) as belonging to the respective K1-K4 clusters. Applying the same procedure to non-state-controlled media, we checked if there is any surge in protests that had not been reported in Russia's state-controlled media. We found broadly similar patterns in volumes of news reporting on protests.
[ Figure 2 about here]
In Figure 3 , red circles show framing scores of individual news articles published by state-controlled media on the disorder-freedom to protest scale, and the red curve represents smoothed values of the framing scores over the same time period. Framing of protests by non-state-controlled media is represented by a black line. Note that individual articles are not shown because that would make the graph over-crowded. In the graph, we observe that the framing of protest by state-controlled sources and non-state-controlled media tended to go parallel until mid-February 2014. After that, the framing of protest in Russia's state-controlled media becomes more negative and remains significantly different from that of non-state-controlled media until August 2014.
[ Figure 3 about here] [ Figure 4 about here]
Next, we estimated differences in framing between sources using regression analysis. 18 Although K4
had been the most negative cluster in Figure 5 , the result of the regression analysis suggests that the Kremlincontrolled media's framing had been actually most negative in K3, as compared to the other time periods. 
Russian state-controlled media will be significantly less likely to employ the disorder framing of protest after the eruption of hostilities in the Donbas as compared to coverage of protests in the wake of the annexation of
Crimea.
[ Figure 5 about here]
Having presented the variations in protest framing for the different time periods and news sources, we now turn to exploring the agenda-setting dimension of Russian state media's coverage of popular discontent in
Ukraine. In our analysis of protest framing, we employed the LSS technique. To analyse the agenda-setting aspect of Russia's media strategy in Ukraine we now rely on a more straightforward content analysis technique of searching key words in news corpora and analyzing variations in frequency of use in different time periods.
Considering that we observe an anomalous dip in the state-controlled media's protest framing scores in K3 in particular, we generate a random selection of stories that appeared in that time period. This is meant to help us identify themes that featured most prominently just when the Russian media resorted to especially negative coverage of discontent in Ukraine.
We find that many stories in the sample featured references to Ukraine's federalization, to the constitutional status of disputed territories and to the status of ethnic Russians and Russian language speakers.
The stories also contained references to violent disruption of pro-Russian protests or to violence on the Maidan (captured by the framing dimension of our analysis). 19 We therefore estimated how protests were framed in association with the use of keywords 'federation' (Федера*), 'constitution' (конституц*), 'Russian' (русск*)-the stem of the word that conveys the ethnic, rather than nation-state meaning of Russian-, 'reform' (реформ*) and 'referendum' (референдум*). We created dummy variables for occurrences of those keywords in news articles by simple pattern matching. We then explored the nature of protest framing associated with those words using multivariate regression analysis. As shown in Table 3 , all but one of those keywords are found to be strongly and significantly (p<0.05) associated with negative framing of protest in Russia's state-controlled media. Although 'referendum' is associated with more positive protest framing, we find that in stories featuring 'federation' or 'Russian' along with 'referendum', protest coverage likewise trends towards the disorder rhetoric.
[ Table 3 about here]
These results largely corroborate H4, which states that Russian state-controlled media will be
significantly more likely to frame protest as disorder when advancing the agenda of Ukraine's 'federalisation', 'referenda' on the status of regions with significant Russian-speaking populations, 'reform' and 'constitutional' status of ethnically 'Russian' or 'Russian-speaking' populations.
From our sample of news items, we also obtained frequencies of news stories containing each of the keywords in clusters. In so doing, we sought to ascertain whether Russia's state-controlled media used specific words more frequently than did the non-state-controlled media. The results presented in Figure 6 show that 'reform' featured 1.59 times more frequently in stories published in Russia's state-controlled media as compared to those in the non-state-controlled sources in K2. The words 'Russian', 'referendum' and 'federation', respectively, featured 7.25, 6.54 and 1.53 times more frequently in state-controlled media in K3. In K4, the words 'federation' (1.64 times), 'Russian' (2.02 times) and 'referendum' (2.11 times) appeared more frequently in state-controlled media than in the non-state-controlled sources. All of those differences were found to be statistically significant (p<0.01) in Chi-square tests.
[ Figure 6 about here]
We also investigated keyword use until the end of 2014 and compared it with keyword occurrences in non-state-controlled sources. We found that the Kremlin-controlled media frequently used the above-listed keywords only between February and June 2014 ( Figure 7 ). After this period, the differences in frequency of usage between the state-controlled and non-state-controlled sources are not very pronounced.
[ Figure 7 about here] 'reform' and 'constitutional status' of ethnically 'Russian' or 'Russian-speaking' populations.
For ease of interpretation of how key developments surrounding the crisis might have influenced
Russia's media coverage, we created a timeline of key events between November 2013, when the Euromaidan protests erupted, and August 2014, by which time Russia annexed Crimea and had been involved in supporting the Donbas rebels (Figure 8) . From the timeline, it is evident that Russia intensified its negative coverage of the Euromaidan significantly after the Russia-supported government fell and Yanukovych fled the country. Prior to that, Russian media's framing of protests is not markedly different from that of non-state-controlled sources.
Furthermore, there does not appear to be obvious correspondence between the numbers of casualties among
Russian speakers as violence erupted, and negative coverage of the Euromaidan. In Odessa, on 2 May 2014, forty-eight protesters were killed. Hundreds of civilians, both Russian-and Ukrainian-speakers, died in the Donbas between April 2014 and the end of our observation period, December 2014. In fact, the military hostilities involving the rebels and armed forces loyal to the new government in Kiev in the summer months resulted in significantly more casualties among Russian-speakers in the Donbas than in April, when we observe the most pronounced trend in the negative framing of protest combined with media narratives about federalisation and the status of Russian speakers.
Additional author-gathered data on protests occurring throughout Ukraine between February and September 2014 and featuring slogans that either challenged or, alternatively, supported Russia's involvement in the crisis, indicate that protests in the latter category peaked around February-March, only to subside by May.
The protests data indicate that protests broadly supportive of the Euromaidan and challenging Russia's intervention in Ukraine generally featured larger numbers of participants; many occurred in the south-eastern regions (Figures 9-11 ). These data indicate that sustained protest activism by Russian speakers in favour of separatism was not widespread in territories outside of the Crimea. To further make sense of Russia's media coverage of protests, we now turn to discussing the debates on Russian foreign policy objectives in Ukraine.
[ Figure 8 about here]
[ Figure 9 about here]
[ Figure 10 about here]
[ Figure 11 about here]
Russia's Objectives in Ukraine
To what extent does our analysis help adjudicate between key strands of the wider debates on the drivers of Russia's foreign policy in Ukraine, going beyond the more specific issue of media manipulation? One area of debate concerns the extent to which Russia's policy has been driven by a normative impulse to protect Russianspeakers (Tsygankov 2015) . A related set of questions is whether the separatist impulse in the Crimea and Donbas has been largely home-grown (Giuliano 2015; Kudelia 2014) , with Russia reacting to the grassroots appeals of Russian-speakers as part of its normative, value-driven, agenda (Tsygankov 2015) , or, alternatively, whether these appeals had been part of an externally-(Russia-) driven strategic calculations that in fact involved engineering these sentiments and demands in the first place. Finally, scholars have highlighted that disagreement among Russia's leaders (Bacon 2015; Dugin 2014; Horvath 2015) 20 and failure to reign in the motley factions of pro-separatism fighters in the Donbas (Shevel 2014 ) have arguably also shaped Russia's tactics in the course of the early, pivotal months of the conflict in Ukraine.
Andrei Tsygankov's (2014) concept of 'honour' in international relations provides an apt characterisation of his argument about Russia's imperative to come to the aid of Ukraine's Russian-speakers. It is important to note that Tsygankov accepts that a combination of factors motivated Russia's policy in Ukraine in the wake of the Euromaidan. These factors include security concerns about EU's and NATO's eastward expansion and concerns about protecting the benefits of economic interdependence among post-Soviet states (see also Sakwa 2015) . But, he also highlights the ideological, moral and nationalism imperatives like shared 'Slavic culture' and 'protecting Russia's old historical and cultural ties with its neighbour' as significant-and genuine-drivers of these policies, alongside material and security interests (Tsygankov 2015) . Thus, Tsygankov (2015, pp. 287, 288) writes:
Russian values include an authentic concept of spiritual freedom inspired by Eastern Christianity and the idea of a strong, socially protective state capable of defending its own subjects from abuses at home and threats from abroad. . . . Russians consider Ukrainian people to be 'brotherly'
and are resentful of what they view as the Western nations' attempts to challenge the established cultural bond or to convert Ukraine into their own system of values.
Relatedly, in what would support the conjecture that Russia had been reacting to the pleas of Ukraine's Russian-speaking populations, a number of scholars, whether they share the argument about the nationalist and normative concerns driving Russian policy in Ukraine or not, have emphasized genuine popular support for federalisation or outright separatism, and for calls for the protection of the rights of Russian speakers. Some scholars have for instance argued that Russian-speaking populations felt betrayed by the corrupt national elite and its cronies in the disintegrating political structures in Ukraine's regions (Sakwa 2015) . Elise Giuliano (2015) reminds us that an emphasis on Russia's role in the crisis tends to obscure the fact that a significant minority of populations in the Donbas shared the demands of the separatists. Serhiy Kudelia (2014) Accordingly, those who have highlighted the value imperatives of Russia's foreign policy as a primary motivating factor have been leaning more towards interpreting Russia's intervention in Ukraine as a response to sentiments and demands of Russian speakers. By contrast, proponents of the strategic interests argument have underlined how Russia initiated the secessionist impulse in Ukraine in the first place. They have also argued that the Putin regime manipulated nationalist sentiment and used the 'thinkers' associated with its radical expression to garner support for irredentism in Ukraine. It then proceeded to distance himself from radical nationalist agenda when it became evident that adhering to this agenda would involve substantial economic and military costs (Laruelle 2015a,b) . Staying put with an irredentist agenda in the face of evidence that Putin's meddling was unwelcome would of course present significant public relations-and military and other collateral-costs to a regime seeking to portray itself as the protector of the rights of Russia's brethren in the wider Russkiy mir (Russian World).
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The argument that Putin's actions in Ukraine largely reflected his geopolitical tactical and strategic calculations is also supported from the quarters of the ultra-nationalist ideologues themselves. Some of these individuals in the wake of Crimea's annexation rallied around Putin only to feel betrayed as the events on the ground unfolded. 23 Alexander Dugin highlighted the deep divisions within the Russian policy establishment that emerged after it became evident that a Crimea-style, 'peaceful' scenario was not to materialize elsewhere in Our media analysis lends further credence to arguments that highlight how tactical considerations, and less so, the 'honourable' impulse to protect Russian-speakers abroad in the name of an overarching national idea, drove Putin's policy during the pivotal months following the eruption of the Euromaidan protests. The
Russian media amplified the rhetoric of chaos, violence and disorder threatening fellow Russian-speakers and projected legalistic jargon about federalisation, constitutional change and the rights of Russian speakers. It then toned down this rhetoric at the point when violence erupted in the Donbas. The fact that the Kremlin-guided press did not engage much in such rhetoric after April suggests that either Putin failed to concern himself with the pleas of Russian speakers about federalisation, constitutional change or human rights on the ground, or that he and his entourage engineered or grossly amplified these concerns in the first place. The latter interpretation is more plausible in light of both our media analysis and the discussion of the qualitative literature on the subject.
Conclusions
In this paper, we performed content analysis of Russian state-controlled media's coverage of the Euromaidan protests. Specifically, we analysed how Russian media framed protests and how framing changed over time as the political events unfolded and as Russia annexed Crimea and engaged in a proxy war in the Donbas. We also explored the agenda-setting dimension of media coverage to ascertain how the media's rhetoric on the status of ethnic Russians and on constitutional reform changed over time. Our framing analysis is based on the Latent Semantic Scaling (LSS) technique developed by one of the authors of the paper. The technique enabled us to construct a Russian-language dictionary that could be used to perform electronic content analysis of media coverage of protest along a disorder-freedom to protest scale. The framing and agenda-setting aspects of Russian state-controlled media's coverage of the events in Ukraine were contrasted with those of Ukrainian and Russian media sources that are not controlled by the state. We find that Russian state-controlled media became significantly more likely than did the non-state controlled sources to adapt a disorder frame in coverage of protests after Yanukovych fled the country and in the wake of Russia's annexation of Crimea. The media also intensified rhetoric on the status of ethnic Russians and federalization. Both the framing and agenda-setting aspects of the coverage of protests by Russian state-controlled media however roughly fell in line with coverage by sources outside of the Kremlin control following the eruption of violence in the Donbas.
We are fully aware that our analysis of shifts in media framing of protest and in the usage of specific terms related to the status of ethnic Russians and territorial reform has its limitations when it comes to uncovering the motivations behind the shifts in framing. Systematically analysing what led to the observed shifts in media coverage of protest would require an in-depth exploration of the 'black box' of the Kremlin's decision making, which falls outside the scope of our paper. For instance, our analysis stops short of ascertaining the extent to which factional struggles among the Kremlin elites affected the observed shifts in policy. Nevertheless, our findings correspond to other studies cited in the paper, which, while not specifically analysing the media, have found similar tactical shifts in Russia's foreign policy in Ukraine as the conflict unfolded. This in turn provides some confidence in the validity of our media analysis method.
Our paper helps nuance other systematic research specifically concerned with the role of Russia's media in the furtherance of domestic and foreign policy. Thus, Stephen Hutchings and Vera Tolz (2015) have rightly cautioned against regarding the leading pro-Kremlin media personalities as mere puppets of the Kremlin.
Puppets they may not be, but when it comes to policies of immense national significance, the narratives of media producers suspiciously follow the ebbs and flows of the Kremlin's shifting tactics in Ukraine.
Our analysis also contributes to the wider comparative theorizing into the media as a tool in the domestic and foreign policies of authoritarian states (Gehlbach and Sonin 2014; Jones-Rooy 2012; King, Pan et al. 2013; Morozov 2012; Stockmann and Gallagher 2011; Treisman and Guriev 2015) . In the emerging literature on the use of the media to manipulate information on protest in autocracies, there is disagreement as to how rulers will exploit nationalist sentiment in particular to advance their domestic political and foreign policy objectives. Some scholars have suggested that authoritarian regimes may want to limit information that would fuel nationalist sentiment at home considering the potential implications for political instability (King, Pan et al. 2013 ). Others have argued that authoritarian rulers may find some utility in fuelling nationalism at home if it helps them to rally citizens behind the regime (Dimitrov 2008; Hutchings and Tolz 2015; King, Pan et al. 2013; Morozov 2012; Weiss 2013) . The specific techniques of manipulation of public opinion will of course vary depending on the peculiarities of national politics. In the Russian case, a number of scholars have noted that the state-controlled media began to systematically exploit Russian nationalist sentiment in the wake of the December 2011 protests (Chaisty and Whitefield 2015; Hutchings and Tolz 2015; Tolz and Harding 2015) .
These protests featured an unlikely alliance between liberal and nationalist forces in opposition to the Putin regime (Laruelle 2014; Popescu 2012; Umland 2011) . That Russia resorted to nationalist rhetoric in its media coverage of the Euromaidan thus to a certain extent may represent an extension of the policy of rallying citizens around the regime under the Russian nationalist banner. What we find however is that the state-controlled media 27 quickly changed tactics as the events in Ukraine unfolded. As noted in the paper, these tactical shifts may have come in response to the collapse of the Yanukovych government, and then shifted again in response to western sanctions. They may have also changed when Russia realised that domestic appetite for the annexation of the Donbas territories in Ukraine is weak. The flow of refugees into Russia from the conflict zone may have also tempered domestic support for Russia's irredentism in Ukraine. The shifts in media framing and nationalist rhetoric that we observe reflect the regime's adaptability to rapidly changing political circumstances at home and abroad.
Our Russian media analysis thus provides an additional building block in the generation of empirical knowledge about the sources of both authoritarian resilience (Nathan 2003) and authoritarian vulnerabilities (Pei 2012) , much of which is derived from studies of China. Similar to China, the capacity of Russia's regime to effect tactical policy shifts given the information about past, ongoing and new popular challenges may well foster authoritarian resilience. Alternatively, we also show how the peculiarities of protest framing and of the media's agenda setting could provide clues as to regime vulnerabilities otherwise obscured behind the mask of apparent invincibility to domestic and external public opinion. Note to protest data in figures 10 and 11: The data were compiled from Russian and Ukrainian media sources, including both Ukrainian-and Russian-language sources. They cover protests occurring across Ukraine in the period between February and September 2014. Our objective was to capture the regional dimension of mobilization and counter-mobilization in Ukraine during the period between Yanukovych's flight from Kiev and the weeks following Russia's annexation of Crimea and onset of separatist violence in the Donbas. This mapping exercise also allows us to get a sense of the broader pattern of mobilization in the country going beyond the Euromaidan, which has formed the focus of much of the scholarly analysis of protest dynamics during the crisis. Each protest report was cross-checked against other sources for accuracy. In compiling the data, the following general definition of protests was employed. Protest refers to a gathering of people with the explicit aim of articulating particular demands publicly in a public space. Among the protest events recorded are several demonstrations organized together with football matches played in the cities (such as in Kharkov on 27
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April 2014). Such marches had been organized a day before the football match, with organisers encouraging people to join the protest event before or after the match. A number of protests have had a violent outcome, in that they involved clashes with other groups or the police, or have resulted in occupation of public buildings and death. We include the latter type of protests, but exclude those featuring armed groups whose main objective was to seize local authority buildings and other government offices and assume power in particular localities.
The latter type of events would be reported in the Ukrainian media as 'armed people in masks have seized . . . .'
These events mainly occurred beginning in April 2014 in the Donbas localities.
It is important to note that following the change of government in , some cities explicitly outlawed public gatherings, while other cities have imposed restrictions on public assembly or tended to turn down requests to hold protests from April onwards. These restrictions are likely to have led to a decrease in both the size and frequency of demonstrations. Furthermore, during this time, Ukraine's new authorities authorised arrests of pro-Russian activists. Likewise, in the Crimea and Donbas activists challenging Russia's intervention and occupation were also arrested.
Only the protests that could be cross-checked using at least two different sources were included. For the purposes of constructing the protest Figures, we used the most conservative estimates of number of participants recorded in the media. For instance, if a media protest story suggested a range of participants of 7,000-10,000 people, we used the figure of 7,000. Likewise, if a story featured a reference to 'several hundred' participants, we used the most conservative figure of 200. In recording the protest data, we provide a link to media stories from which the data were derived. These data are available from the authors upon request.
